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Midcourse Corrections: 
New Disclosure Duties for Brokers in Short Sales 
Roger Bernhardt 
Holmes v Summer (2010) 188 CA4th 1510, ___ CR3d ___, reported at p 200, includes an easy 
set of facts to describe, but a hard analysis to cover straightforwardly; rich issues bump into each 
other at multiple places. 
The facts were that frustrated buyers sued the sellr’s broker for not informing them that the 
property they were shown was overencumbered and that the lender’s consent to a short sale 
would be required for the deal to close. Since that consent was never obtained, the deal never did 
close and they filed this action. The trial court sustained the brokers’ demurrers, but the court of 
appeal reversed. 
A Major Decision or a Major Problem? 
The opening paragraph of the opinion warns readers that the court believes that its decision is 
going to be a portentous one in light of the horrible impact that such brokers’ activities can have 
on our fragile real estate market. “Particularly in these days of rampant foreclosures and short 
sales,” brokers’ failure to disclose that “the property is so greatly overencumbered that it is 
almost certain clear title cannot be conveyed for the agreed-upon price” means that “sales fall 
through, purchasers become leery of the marketplace and lenders preparing to extend credit to 
those purchasers waste valuable time in processing u eless loans.” 
Now, while overencumbering property and not disclosing important information to buyers is 
always serious, I do not think that the situation described here is that common or dangerous. As a 
general matter, brokers do not care to waste time working on deals that are unlikely to close, and 
they are unlikely to see much profit in keeping potential buyers uninformed about the likelihood 
of completion. Indeed, the California Association of Realtors has a standard form for their 
members to give to sellers who want to list overencumbered properties and another one to give to 
buyers interested in purchasing them. Both are filld with warnings about the uncertainty of 
these deals. In fact, new and probably more elaborate forms are about to be released. While the 
Department of Real Estate has recently expressed it concern about fraud in short sales, its worry 
has been over misinforming lenders about the values involved, not misinforming buyers about 
the need for lenders to consent. (Last year’s statute requiring prompt lender response to a short 
pay demand—CC §2943—has probably caused lenders generally to say “no” more quickly 
rather than incur sanctions for thinking too long. This year’s new law prohibiting deficiency 
recoveries after short sales—CCP §580e—will likely discourage lender consent even more.) 
1. Is Shortness Material? 
The first major issue in the opinion was whether the seller’s brokers had any duty to inform 
the buyers that the property was currently underwater. While California law requires a seller and 
his broker to disclose all facts “ materially affecting the value or desirability of the property,” the 
brokers claimed that the amount of debt on a property does not affect its value or desirability 
because the buyer’s right to a clear title means that the debt always will be paid off—or else the 
deal will not close. Debt is not like a physical defect that can outlast the closing of escrow. 
The court, however, saw the situation more globally. There is harm from both kinds of defects, 
just in different ways. 
While a buyer may be harmed by acquiring title to a property with undisclosed defects, such 
as hazardous waste or soils subsidence problems, a buyer may also be harmed by entering into 
an escrow to purchase property when it is highly likely that, unbeknownst to the buyer, the 
escrow will never close. [188 CA4th at 1519; emphasis dded.] 
We are so accustomed to thinking about buyers aggrieved because they were defrauded into 
completing a purchase of problematic property that we end to assume that those who were lucky 
enough to discover the fraud in time to get out of the deal before it closed do not have a similarly 
actionable fraud claim. They were victims only of attempted fraud, lacking the necessary 
reliance feature to entitle them to recover damages. 
This assumption gains support from the statutory measure of damages for fraud in real estate 
sales and purchases—the difference between what the buyer paid and the value of what he got 
(CC §3343)—a measure that cannot possibly work in a transaction that never closed, when the 
buyer paid nothing and received nothing. 
Section 3343 adds reliance damages to this general me sure, which makes it appropriate for 
buyers also to recover whatever they actually spent in preparing to go through with a deal. But 
how does that work when —as here—the major harm claimed by the buyers was the sale of their 
old house (done to get the cash necessary to buy the new one)? If the buyers sold their old house 
at its market value, what can they recover from the seller or his broker for that transaction? Their 
closing costs and the commission they paid to their broker in that sale should qualify, but is that 
all? Must the buyers say that they sold their old house for a loss or are now homeless to get real 
damages? General tort damages under CC §3333 for deceit sometimes make more sense in 
unusual real estate situations (see Bernhardt, On Making & Breaking Contracts, at 
http://www.rogerbernhardt.com/jan_2004.html), but even when that is so, are there general 
damages in such a case? Or are actual damages being sought primarily as a foundation for 
recovery of punitive damages? 
What Other Information Is Material Under a “Disclosure at the Outset” Standard? 
The court defends its conclusion by saying impositin of a duty on the brokers “to disclose 
information alerting the buyers that the sale was at high risk of failure would be to further the 
purpose of protecting buyers from harm and providing them with sufficient information to enable 
them to wisely choose whether to enter into the transaction.” 188 CA4th at 1520. From that I 
surmise that this obligation is not limited to overoptimistic short-sale situations. The obligation 
to inform the other side of the “high risk of failure” of one’s own client should worry sellers’ 
brokers not only about getting lenders’ consents to discount their loans but also about getting the 
consents of any other parties holding interests in he title, or clearing away burdens, or obtaining 
the other entitlements necessary to the transfer. Likewise, buyers’ brokers should worry about 
the need to warn sellers about the risks of their clients’ ability to fi nd sufficient funds to close, or 
being able to sell their own house first (even when it is not a stated condition), or perhaps even 
the possibility of the buyers using the backout rights that the contract gives them as an intended 
cover for changing their minds because a better deal somewhere else may show up, or even 
because of generalized remorse about the deal (see Bernhardt, Midcourse Corrections: The Cost 
of Free Looks—Ruminations onSteiner v Thexton, 33 CEB RPLR 61 (May 2010), also vailable 
at http://www.rogerbernhardt.com/may_2010.html). 
It may not be that likely that courts will actually hold brokers responsible to the other side in 
these situations, but it certainly is likely that plaintiffs’ lawyers will heavily rely on the language 
of this opinion to fight off brokers’ demurrers and motions for summary judgment to get their 
cases to juries. 
2. The Timing of Disclosures 
The brokers had also argued that they were not liable because “the liens were disclosed during 
escrow” (emphasis added), but they lost because the court held that they “had a duty to disclose 
the liens before the buyers signed the agreement” (emphasis in original), because “[o]nly then 
could the buyers weigh the risks of entering into an agreement, and preparing their finances and r 
elated affairs to facilitate completion of the purchase.” 188 CA4th at 1520. This makes it 
important to think about not only what must be disclo ed, but when it must be disclosed. While 
there are many cases offering guidance on the former (what matters should be disclosed), there is 
not much out there as to the latter (when those disclosures should be made). 
It is clear that when a matter is disclosed before the first offer is solicited, that is always early 
enough; it is just as equally clear that a matter not disclosed until after escrow has closed (and the 
checks have cleared and title has passed) is too late. But the period in between those two events 
lacks similar certainty. Consider the following: 
• A defect is first disclosed in a transfer disclosure statement that was not given to the buyers until 
after the contract had been signed. Is that disclosure timely enough to eliminate any accusation of 
fraud, if the buyers have a 3-day right of rescission thereafter? 
• A disclosure is not made until 2 weeks after the contract was signed. Is that untimely, if it was 
still within the 17-day backout period that many real state form contracts include? 
• A disclosure is not made until after all of the contingency periods have expired. Is it too late, 
even if it was accompanied by an offer to let the buyers withdraw? What if this happened—as 
occurred in Jue v Smiser (1994) 23 CA4th 312, 28 CR2d 242—in last 2 or 3 days before close of 
escrow? 
In each of these situations, what if the buyers had (by the date of disclosure) already listed 
their own house for sale (becoming potentially liable for a broker’s commission if they remove it 
from the market) or taken some other similarly detrimental action? 
I suspect that as we go down this road, we will discover that there will be no single rule or 
clock to apply to all problems, and that we will come to live with dozens of contextual rules 
about the dating and completeness of post-opening-day foreclosures. 
3. When It Is the Seller’s Broker Who Did Not Inform the Buyers 
This would have been a considerably easier case had the efendant—who was apparently the 
only broker in the picture—designated herself as a du l agent rather than solely agent for the 
sellers. That way, she would have had fiduciary duties to the buyers and made it much easier to 
impose disclosure duties on her. Instead, her status made the court of appeal feel compelled to go 
through the classic six-factor privity analysis befor  imposing such duties on her. 
In general, I think those six factors always get to the result a court wants to reach, which 
makes serious analysis of them feel like a waste of time. While that may describe the “intended 
to affect plaintiff,” “foreseeability of harm,” “certainty of injury,” “close connection,” and 
“prevention of future harm” factors (all of which led, I thought, to completely predictable 
results), the court’s analysis of the “moral blame” factor was worth noting. 
Moral Blame and Confidentiality 
The judges and the brokers had strongly differing views on this issue. For the judges, it was 
a case of “rudimentary fairness” that the buyers be informed before they opened escrow. But for 
the brokers, it was a question of being forced to “vi late their duty of confidentiality to the 
seller” in light of the provision in CC §2079.16 tha  “an agent is not obligated to reveal to either 
party any confidential information obtained from the other party that does not involve the 
affirmative duties set forth above.” 
That sentence is no model of legislative clarity. Does “not obligated to reveal” mean 
“obligated not to reveal”? (See Bernhardt, Midcourse Correction: Nondisclosures by Sellers, 
Brokers, and Home Inspectors, 24 CEB RPLR 114 (Apr. 2001), also available at 
http://www.rogerbernhardt.com/april_2001.html.) If the language does not impose a duty of 
keeping information confidential, then what does it do? Brokers believe that they are duty-bound 
not to relay to the buyer what the seller has told hem about his personal financial problems, just 
as they must keep silent about the seller’s health issues when they relate to AIDS (CC §1710.2—
although it is similarly hard to translate the circu tous language of a section that says 
nondisclosure is not actionable but is then silent on he effect of disclosure). 
The court gave two significant responses to the brokers’ confidentiality contention. The first 
response was that the statutory reference applies only t  matters that do not materially affect the 
property. If that means that brokers are entitled to not disclose only what does not matter, it 
makes one wonder why the legislature would ever bother to create that silly a law. 
The second response was more substantive and political. Any obligation of confidentiality a 
broker owes to her own client is trumped by the obligation of fairness she owes to the other 
party, even if that is not her client (188 CA4th at 1526): 
The solution to the conflict between the duty to disclose and the duty to maintain client 
confidentiality is clear. When the duty of fairness to all parties requires the disclosure to the 
buyer of confidential information reflecting a substantial risk that the escrow will not close, then 
the seller’s real estate agent or broker must obtain the seller’s permission to disclose such 
confidential information to the buyer, before the buyer enters into a contract to purchase the 
property. In a case such as the one before us, where the seller’s financial situation is so 
precarious, if the seller is unwilling to consent to the disclosure of confidential information, and 
the real estate agent or broker nonetheless chooses to undertake representation of the seller, he or 
she does so at the peril of liability in the event the transaction goes awry due to the undisclosed 
risks involved. 
In light of such a “balancing,” can a broker ever ag ee to keep a matter secret for her client? 
“Don’t ask if you don’t want to have to tell” becomes the principle guiding behavior. Because 
real estate brokers seem content to live within the contradictions of dual agency law, this 
disclosure rule may impose no new great danger, but we should hope that this kind of weighing 
is never also similarly applied to attorneys. 
The court summed up its position by saying that it was not converting a seller’s broker into a 
buyer’s fiduciary. “Although the seller’s agent does not generally owe a fiduciary duty to the 
buyer, he or she nonetheless owes the buyer the affirm tive duties of care, honesty, good faith, 
fair dealing and disclosure.” 188 CA4th at 1528. Think about how to explain to your broker 
client that she may not be a fiduciary to one party, but nevertheless she has duties of fairness to 
that same party that may take away whatever safety net her nonfiduciary status had given her. 
Any attorney representing brokers should advise them to communicate the fact that the seller’s 
property is underwater (i.e., the debts against the property exceed its fair market value) to 
potential buyers right at the start—along with any and all other possibly relevant facts. That is 
common sense as well as good conduct. On the other hand, I am not sure that many attorneys 
representing buyers would have agreed to bring damages ctions on their behalf because they 
had not been so informed at the beginning of the deal, if they nevertheless learned before close. 
Now, after the Holmes decision, that case looks somewhat more promising. 
 
 
Holmes v Summer (2010) 188 CA4th 1510, ___ CR3d ___ 
Summer, a licensed real estate broker who representd the seller of residential real property, 
listed the property at $749,000 to $799,000, stating hat the seller was motivated and that the 
broker would receive a 3-percent commission. Phil and Jenille Holmes (Buyers) saw the listing 
and were shown the property by Summer, who did not mention any encumbrances on the 
property that might affect the seller’s ability to sell at the advertised price. Buyers offered to 
purchase the property for $700,000, free and clear of ll monetary liens and encumbrances. The 
seller counteroffered $749,000 with a 30-day escrow; Buyers accepted. The counteroffer did not 
mention that the property was subject to three deeds of trust totaling $1,141,000, making it 
extremely difficult to transfer the property free and clear of all monetary liens. Buyers were 
unaware of the liens when they signed the purchase documents. Buyers then sold their existing 
home in order to purchase the seller’s property. Seller failed to convince the lienholders to accept 
a short sale, and thus was unable to close escrow. 
Buyers filed suit against Summer and her employer (collectively, Brokers) alleging 
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and deceit based on misrepresentation and failure to 
disclose. Brokers demurred, stating that they were not required to guarantee the seller’s 
performance and if the seller could not come up with cash to close the transaction, that was a 
business decision for which the brokers were not liable. Buyers replied that Brokers knew about 
the excess debt when listing the property and were unsuccessfully attempting to arrange a short 
sale during escrow. The trial court sustained the demurrer; the court of appeal reversed. 
The court of appeal noted that if a seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or 
desirability of the property that are known or accessible only to it and also knows that those facts 
are not known to the buyer, then the seller has a duty to disclose them to the buyer. Lingsch v 
Savage (1961) 213 CA2d 729, 29 CR 201. If the seller’s real state agent is also aware of such 
facts, then that agent also has a duty to disclose. 213 CA2d at 736. The purpose of the rule is to 
ensure that the buyer has sufficient information to make an informed decision whether to 
purchase. The buyer may be harmed by entering into a  escrow to purchase property when it is 
highly likely that the escrow will never close. The real estate agent is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to protect those whom the agent is i ducing into a transaction for the purpose of 
earning a commission. Easton v Strassburger (1984) 152 CA3d 90, 98 n2, 199 CR 383. Brokers 
had a duty to disclose, before Buyers signed the purchase agreement, information alerting Buyers 
that the sale was at high risk of failure.  
The court noted that Buyers were not in a position  protect themselves because it is not 
typical in a residential purchase for the buyer to perform a title search before making an offer. 
The California Association of Realtors standard form purchase contract states that the buyer will 
receive a preliminary title report after escrow is opened. Even if a title search would have 
divulged deeds of trust, it would not have disclosed the balance owing on the promissory notes. 
Further, when a seller agrees to sell a property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, the 
seller impliedly represents that he will be in a positi n to deliver title free and clear. The court 
also noted that even if Buyers had been on constructive notice of the liens, the seller still would 
have had a duty to disclose.  
Brokers argued that the court’s ruling would require them to divine when a seller may have 
breached agreements and to disclose that to the buyer. However, the court noted that the seller’s 
financial situation was clear to Brokers at the time the purchase agreement was signed. When an 
agent or broker is aware that either a short sale requi ing the cooperation of a lender or the 
deposit of cash by the seller will be required to release monetary liens, the agent has a duty to 
disclose those facts to the buyer so that the buyer can investigate further regarding the risk that 
the transaction will fail.  
Brokers also argued that imposing this duty to disclose would require them to breach their 
duty of confidentiality to the seller. The court noted, however, that brokers have a duty, under 
CC §2079.16, to disclose confidential matters if they materially affect the desirability of entering 
into the transaction. Brokers also have a duty of honest and fair dealing and good faith. CC 
§2079.16(b). The representation that the property could be purchased for $749,000 was less than 
honest because Brokers knew that the sale was a highly r sky proposition. Brokers also relied on 
duties of confidentiality imposed by the Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice of the National 
Association of Realtors. The court noted, however, that the Code of Ethics establishes that when 
it conflicts with the law, the obligations of the law must take precedence.  
